I see what that article is saying, but it assumes Windows is in control of the multiboot and that the RBRx mini-OS has loaded first. Four measures used together sidestep this completely:
Using a seperate boot manager in a dedicated boot partition;
Keeping each bootable OS in its own dedicated partition;
Keeping shared files (non-OS) in their own non-RBRx partition;
Hiding each OS partition from the others.
The boot manager runs first (eg XOSL) because it inhabits the MBR in the primary partition (could be a very small partition dedicated to XOSL or shared with DOS). The user selects an OS to boot (or it defaults on timeout) and the boot is transfered to the MBR on another partition, which could be Win/RBRx. If so RBRx loads ahead of Windows and functions as normal - but note the user files are elsewhere and not RBRx protected.
If the user boots a Linux partition RBRx is not loaded (because it does not inhabit the MBR of the Linux partition), Linux runs normally and has access to the same user files, but is prevented from interfering with the RBRx-protected Windows OS partition because the boot manager hid that partition away before booting the Linux partition.
For the ultimate in no-fuss ultra secure multibooting, there is a lot to be said for having swappable hard drives (just bung in the one you want and fire up).
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